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                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                           
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 This appeal presents an issue of law: whether interest 
can accrue after the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition 
on a nondischargeable student loan.  The bankruptcy court held 
that debtors would remain liable for the amount of the post-
petition interest that accrued on the unpaid principal of the 
student loan.  The district court affirmed.  This appeal presents 
what appears to be an issue of first impression for the courts of 
appeals as to which, unfortunately, we have found no helpful 
legislative history. 
 I.  
 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Appellants Della and Dwight Webster ("the Websters") 
filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on March 25, 1992.1  Lisa 
and William Leeper ("the Leepers") filed a bankruptcy petition on 
July 28, 1992.  Their Chapter 13 plans have been confirmed and 
are currently in place. 
                     
 
   1 Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the method by 
which individuals with regular income may adjust their debts 
through bankruptcy.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 
1990).  A debtor is required to file a plan providing for the 
submission to the trustee of whatever amount of the debtor's 
income is necessary to execute the plan, and to provide for the 
payment of various secured and unsecured claims existing at the 
time of the filing.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322.  The plan 
submitted by the debtor must be presented for confirmation to the 
bankruptcy court.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1325. 
 
 The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Authority 
("PHEAA") is an unsecured creditor of both the Websters and the 
Leepers.  Both the Websters and the Leepers borrowed money from 
PHEAA to attend college under the guaranteed student loan 
program.  When the Leepers and the Websters filed for bankruptcy, 
PHEAA filed claims with the bankruptcy court for the principal 
amounts owing on the respective loans at the time of the 
bankruptcy petitions plus all pre-petition interest.  Portions of 
the amounts paid pursuant to their two Chapter 13 plans are being 
applied to the PHEAA claims. 
 Neither the Websters nor the Leepers will be able to 
repay their student loan debts in full during the course of their 
Chapter 13 plans.  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988 & Supp. II 
1990), which references 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. II 
1990), debts for student loans such as those guaranteed by PHEAA 
are excepted from discharge in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings 
unless they fall within a hardship exception or unless they 
matured seven years before the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case.2  The parties agree that unless one of the two exceptions 
                     
    
2
 In 1990, Congress amended § 1328 to except debts arising 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) from discharge in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.  Section 523(a)(8) includes: 
 
 [A]ny debt . . . for an educational benefit overpayment 
of loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental 
unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in 
part by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, 
or for an obligation to repay funds received as an 
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless-- 
 
  (A) such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend 
overpayment first became due more than 7 years 
applies, PHEAA will be able to collect the balance of the amount 
owing on its bankruptcy claims at the end of the sixty-month 
bankruptcy period for each of the debtors. 
 In addition, PHEAA intends to accrue interest on the 
unpaid principal balance of the loans while the two Chapter 13 
bankruptcy cases are pending and intends to collect that interest 
after the plans are completed.  Thus, after their plans were 
confirmed both the Leepers and the Websters (hereafter "the 
debtors") initiated adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court 
against PHEAA, invoking the bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).  Each complaint sought an order 
from the bankruptcy court declaring (1) that PHEAA is not 
entitled to accrue post-petition interest during the pendency of 
the Chapter 13 proceedings, and (2) that payments made to PHEAA 
under the Chapter 13 plans be applied only to the principal 
balances of the loans.   
 In its answers to the complaints, PHEAA conceded that 
all plan payments made by the debtors should be applied only to 
their bankruptcy claims, which include the outstanding principal 
balances of the loans and all pre-petition interest.  PHEAA 
                                                                  
(exclusive of any applicable suspension of the 
repayment period) before the date of the filing of 
the petition; or 
 
  (B) excepting such debt from discharge under this 
paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the 
debtor and the debtor's dependents; 
 
 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).   
maintained, however, that it is entitled to accrue post-petition 
interest on the unpaid principal balance of the student loan 
debts during the pendency of the Chapter 13 plans.   
 After the two cases were consolidated and the parties 
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the bankruptcy court 
granted summary judgment in favor of PHEAA.  The bankruptcy court 
relied primarily upon Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 
(1964), in concluding that post-petition interest may accrue on a 
nondischargeable student loan debt during the pendency of a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, although it ordered that all of 
the debtors' payments during the course of the plan should be 
applied to the principal balances and the pre-petition interest.  
The court declined to address the debtors' claim that the accrual 
of post-petition interest would impose an undue hardship on the 
debtors under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).  The court determined 
that the hardship claim would not be ripe for review until the 
debtors have completed all payments under the Chapter 13 plan.  
That determination is not before us in this appeal.     
       The district court entered an order affirming the 
bankruptcy court's decision, essentially adopting the reasoning 
of the bankruptcy court.  The debtors appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction over the debtors' appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).  Because the only issues presented 
in this appeal involve the proper interpretation of the 
Bankruptcy Code, our review is plenary.  See In re Roth American, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1992); see also In re Abbotts 
Dairies, 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986).   
 II. 
 DISCUSSION 
 A. 
 Under the Bankruptcy Code, creditors are not entitled 
to include unmatured (or "post-petition") interest as part of 
their claims in the bankruptcy proceedings.  See 11 U.S.C. § 
502(b)(2) (1988); see also Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 
(1911) (noting that this rule is derived from a fundamental 
principle of the English bankruptcy system).  This longstanding 
rule is designed to assure that no creditor gains an advantage or 
suffers a loss due to the delays inherent in liquidation and 
distribution of the estate.  American Iron & Steel Mfg. Co. v. 
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 233 U.S. 261, 266 (1914); see also In re 
Hanna, 872 F.2d 829, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1989).  The prohibition 
against claims for post-petition interest generally applies even 
in instances where the claims are based upon underlying debts 
that are not dischargeable.  See, e.g., City of New York v. 
Saper, 336 U.S. 328, 337-38 (1949); see also In re JAS 
Enterprises, Inc., 143 B.R. 718, 719 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992).   
 In Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964), the 
precedent of most significance for the issue before us, the 
Supreme Court distinguished between denial of post-petition 
interest against the bankruptcy estate on a nondischargeable debt 
and the accrual of interest on a nondischargeable debt during the 
pendency of the bankruptcy to be collected from the debtor after 
the bankruptcy proceeding is completed.  Id. at 362-63.  In 
Bruning, a taxpayer who had been discharged from bankruptcy 
challenged the IRS's contention that it was entitled to collect 
post-petition interest on a nondischargeable tax debt after the 
conclusion of the taxpayer's bankruptcy.  The taxpayer based his 
argument on the traditional rule barring creditors from claiming 
post-petition interest from the bankruptcy estate, a rule now 
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).  The Bruning Court, in a 
unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren, upheld the 
IRS's position.   
 The Court's reasoning is directly applicable to the 
issue before us.  Because Congress made the tax debt 
nondischargeable, it "clearly intended that personal liability 
for unpaid tax debts survive bankruptcy."  Bruning, 376 U.S. at 
361.  The Court then stated that it did not have any "reason to 
believe that Congress had a different intention with regard to 
personal liability for the interest on such debts."  Id.  The 
Court reasoned that "[i]n most situations, interest is considered 
to be the cost of the use of the amounts owing a creditor and an 
incentive to prompt repayment and, thus, an integral part of a 
continuing debt."  Id. at 360.  Thus, the Court concluded, if a 
tax debt was nondischargeable, post-petition interest on that 
debt would also be nondischargeable.  Id. at 363.  The Court held 
that the policy reasons for denying post-petition interest from 
the bankruptcy estate, which it described as "the avoidance of    
unfairness as between creditors" and "the avoidance of 
administrative inconvenience," were not applicable to an action 
brought against the debtor personally.  Id. at 362-63. 
 While Bruning was decided prior to the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, it has been applied by other courts of appeals 
to cases arising under the Code.  See Burns v. United States (In 
re Burns, 887 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1989) (specifically 
addressing the issue of whether the Bruning holding survived the 
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and answering 
affirmatively); In re Hanna, 872 F.2d at 830-31 (same); see also 
Bradley v. United States, 936 F.2d 707, 709-10 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(declining to reach the issue, but acknowledging that "the weight 
of authority" permits accrual of interest on nondischargeable tax 
debts during a bankruptcy); Paulson v. United States (In re 
Paulson), 152 B.R. 46, 49-51 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992) (concluding 
that the Bruning rule applies to actions arising under the 
Bankruptcy Code).   
 In addition, while Bruning involved the accrual of 
post-petition interest on a nondischargeable tax debt, its 
reasoning has been applied to other types of nondischargeable 
debts.  See In re Fullmer, 962 F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(applying Bruning to post-petition interest on a nondischargeable 
tax penalty); In re Burns, 887 F.2d at 1543 (same); In re Brace, 
131 B.R. 612, 613-14 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that post-
petition interest may accrue on a debt that was nondischargeable 
under 11 U.S.C. § 532(a)(2) because it arose from fraudulent 
misrepresentations); In re Kellar, 125 B.R. 716, 720-21 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).   
 The Bruning decision therefore stands for the general 
proposition that creditors may accrue as to the debtor personally 
post-petition interest on nondischargeable debts while a 
bankruptcy is pending.  The bankruptcy court and the district 
court relied primarily upon this proposition in granting and 
affirming summary judgment in favor of PHEAA in this case.  But 
while courts have applied the Bruning rule to permit accrual of 
interest on nondischargeable debts, no court of appeal has 
specifically applied the rule in the Chapter 13 context.  In this 
case, the debtors argue that Bruning is inapplicable to Chapter 
13 bankruptcies and to student loans in particular. 
 B. 
 The debtors contend that it is unfair to apply Bruning 
to Chapter 13 debtors because a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan cannot 
make any provision for the payment of the post-petition interest 
that accrues on a nondischargeable debt.  The debtors fail to 
explain why this problem distinguishes Chapter 13 from Chapter 7 
or Chapter 11.  In all situations where the Bruning rule is 
applicable, the bankruptcy plan cannot make allowances for post-
petition interest; the interest merely accrues and is collectable 
against the debtor after the bankruptcy is completed.  Thus, the 
debtors' effort to distinguish Chapter 13 cases on this ground is 
unpersuasive. 
 The debtors argue that we should follow the authority 
of the New Mexico bankruptcy court in In re Wasson, 152 B.R. 639 
(Bankr. D. N.M. 1993), that rejected a creditor's objection to 
the confirmation of a debtor's Chapter 13 plan that failed to 
provide for post-petition interest on a nondischargeable student 
loan.  Id. at 642.  Notwithstanding the fact that the Wasson 
court explicitly limited its holding disallowing the claim for 
post-petition interest on the nondischargeable student loan to 
instances where the underlying debt was paid in full from the 
bankruptcy estate, id. at 642, the debtors rely on Wasson for the 
general principle that Bruning is inapplicable to Chapter 13 
cases. 
 The result in Wasson has been expressly disapproved in 
In re Shelbayah, 165 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994), and 
Branch v. UNIPAC/NEBHELP (Matter of Branch), 175 B.R. 732 (Bankr. 
D. Neb. 1994), both of which held that post-petition interest may 
accrue on a nondischargeable student loan during the debtor's 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  In Shelbayah, the debtor had conceded 
that the creditor could file a claim for the principal plus all 
pre-petition interest, but objected to the inclusion of the post-
petition interest in the claim.  The debtor argued that the 
creditor was barred from filing a claim for post-petition 
interest by 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2), and, further, that such 
interest was dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988 
& Supp. II 1990), which permits discharge of all debts 
"disallowed under section 502."  Shelbayah, 165 B.R. at 334. 
 The Shelbayah court, applying the analysis of Bruning, 
held that while the creditor was barred from claiming the post-
petition interest in the bankruptcy proceeding, such post-
petition interest could accrue during the course of the 
bankruptcy and would not be dischargeable.  Id. at 337.  The 
court noted that "[a]lmost all courts that have considered the 
issue presented have concluded that the disallowance of 
postpetition interest has no effect on the dischargeability of a 
claim for, and an individual's future liability for, such 
interest."  Id. at 335 (citing, inter alia, Bruning, 376 U.S. 358 
(1964)).  The Shelbayah court acknowledged that the Wasson 
decision reached a contrary result, but concluded that the Wasson 
court's reasoning was based on a decision that "confus[ed] the 
disallowance of unmatured interest with the non-accrual of 
interest."  Shelbayah, 165 B.R. at 337.  The court held that 
while section 502(b)(2) bars claims for unmatured interest 
against the bankruptcy estate, it should not preclude the accrual 
of interest on nondischargeable claims against the debtor.  Id. 
 Even more recently, the bankruptcy court in Branch held 
that post-petition interest may accrue on a nondischargeable 
student loan and is nondischargeable, therefore remaining an 
obligation of the debtor after the bankruptcy case is completed.  
Matter of Branch, 175 B.R. at 734-35.  Branch rejects the Wasson 
analysis as "contrary to the logic of [In re Hanna], the 
authority in [the Eighth] circuit."  Id. at 734.  In re Hanna 
followed Bruning and held that a debtor remains personally liable 
for post-petition interest on a nondischargeable tax debt after 
bankruptcy proceedings are completed.  See 872 F.2d at 831.  We 
agree that the Wasson decision failed to distinguish properly 
between a claim for unmatured interest and the accrual of post-
petition interest on a nondischargeable debt, and that the 
discharge of post-petition interest on nondischargeable debts was 
clearly inconsistent with the mandate of Bruning. 
 With the exception of Wasson, every court that has 
addressed the issue has determined that interest may accrue on 
nondischargeable student loans during the pendency of a Chapter 
13 bankruptcy plan.  See Jordan v. Colorado Student Loan Program 
(In re Jordan), 146 B.R. 31, 32-33 (D. Colo. 1992) (affirming 
denial of debtor's motion to confirm a Chapter 13 plan based on 
creditor's objection that the plan improperly provided that 
interest on the debtor's non-dischargeable student loans would be 
tolled while the bankruptcy was pending); Ridder v. Great Lakes 
Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Ridder), 171 B.R. 345, 346-47 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wis. 1994) (post-petition interest on a nondischargeable 
student loan may be collected after bankruptcy concluded); see 
also In re Crable, 174 B.R. 62, 63 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1994) 
(permitting accrual of post-petition interest on nondischargeable 
debt for child support during pendency of Chapter 13 proceeding 
and noting that cases involving student loans are analogous).  
 It remains to be considered whether there is any 
validity to the debtors' argument that the bankruptcy court 
improperly created two classes of debtors in Chapter 13 cases 
involving nondischargeable student loans.  The debtors base this 
argument on the bankruptcy court's acceptance of the premise in 
Wasson that debtors who will completely satisfy their student 
loan obligations during the course of the Chapter 13 plan will 
have no obligation to pay any post-petition interest,3 whereas 
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  In In re Christian, 25 B.R. 438, 438-39 (Bankr. D. N.M. 
1982), the New Mexico bankruptcy court had held that the Bruning 
rule did not apply to a tax debt which was fully paid out of the 
estate.  Wasson followed Christian and reasoned that "[a]s 
those who, like themselves, will not have satisfied all of their 
loan obligations during the course of the Chapter 13 proceeding 
will be obligated to pay post-petition interest on the loans.  
The debtors then reason that because there is no statutory basis 
for such a distinction, this court should extend the Wasson 
reasoning to bar the accrual and collection of all post-petition 
interest on all nondischargeable student loans in Chapter 13 
cases, whether or not the debt was paid in full during the 
bankruptcy. 
 The premise of the debtors' "two class" argument is 
that no post-petition interest accrues when a nondischargeable 
debt is fully paid out of the estate in the course of the 
bankruptcy proceeding.  The difficulty with the debtors' argument 
is that this court has already held that the Bruning reasoning 
applies even in instances where the debt is paid in full.  In 
Hugh H. Eby Co. v. United States, 456 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1972), a 
taxpayer in a pre-Code case where the underlying debt was paid in 
full argued that it was entitled to recovery of post-petition 
interest on taxes that it had paid.  The taxpayer sought to 
distinguish Bruning, which would have permitted the interest to 
accrue, on the ground that in Bruning the taxes had not been paid 
in full out of the estate.  Id. at 925.  The taxpayer also argued 
                                                                  
Bruning does not apply to cases in which tax debts are fully paid 
out of the estate, it logically follows that Bruning should not 
apply to student loan debts which are fully paid out of the 
estate."  In re Wasson,  152 B.R. 639, 642 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993). 
in Eby that because only liability for post-petition, pre-
confirmation interest was at issue, Bruning was inapplicable.     
 We rejected both distinctions.  We stated: "[I]n 
Bruning, the Supreme Court held that all post-petition interest, 
including interest accrued during the pendency of the bankruptcy 
proceeding, could be collected by the Government from after-
acquired assets of the debtor.  A fortiori, post-petition, pre-
confirmation interest is also collectible."  Id.  We then stated, 
in language of particular relevance here, "That the underlying 
taxes were later paid in full here does not affect the fact that 
appellant had the use of the Government's money during the 
pendency of the reorganization proceeding, and that since the 
underlying debt is not discharged . . . neither is the interest 
which accrues by reason of the use of such money during the 
pendency of the proceedings."  Id.; see also United States v. 
River Coal Co., Inc., 748 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the Bruning rule applied "regardless of whether the 
underlying debt has been paid or not").   
 Eby is good precedent.  We cannot distinguish it, even 
if we were so inclined, on the ground that it is a pre-Code case 
because as we noted earlier, Bruning has been held as equally 
applicable to cases under the Bankruptcy Code.  It follows from 
our construction of Bruning in Eby that even if the 
nondischargeable debt has been paid in full by the bankruptcy 
estate, accrual of post-petition interest is not precluded.  
Therefore the two-class problem identified by the debtors is 
eliminated. 
 C. 
 Finally, the debtors argue that Bruning has been 
overruled by the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).  Relying on cases suggesting that 
the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code should be 
broadly construed, the debtors contend that the accrual of 
interest against them while a bankruptcy is pending violates the 
stay.  They reason that insofar as Bruning permitted such accrual 
prior to the enactment of the Code, it is no longer valid. 
 The debtors' argument here rests on the dubious 
assertion that the act of charging interest on a nondischargeable 
claim is essentially an act to "collect" a debt.  See Appellant's 
Brief at 24.  Because the automatic stay provision bars the 
collection of any debts from the debtor while a bankruptcy is 
pending, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(6), the debtors reason that 
charging interest must necessarily be barred. 
 As the debtors acknowledge, none of the cases applying 
Bruning to post-Code bankruptcy cases has addressed the effect of 
the automatic stay provision on the accrual of post-petition 
interest.  Indeed, those cases permit the accrual of such 
interest with no mention of the automatic stay provision.  
Moreover, as PHEAA notes, the cases cited by the debtors do not 
support the debtors' theory.  Instead, those cases only support 
the propositions that the enforcement of a judicial lien, see, 
e.g., In re Miller, 98 B.R. 110, 113-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989), 
and the garnishment of wages, see, e.g., In re Hulvey, 102 B.R. 
703, 704-05 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1988), after the filing of a 
bankruptcy proceeding violate the automatic stay.  The actions in 
those cases, which involve affirmative efforts by the creditor to 
collect from the debtor, differ significantly from the mere 
accrual of interest, which requires a wholly separate action for 
collection. 
 In light of the lack of support for the debtors' theory 
in either the Code or caselaw, and in light of the continued 
viability of Bruning in bankruptcy cases arising under the Code, 
see Burns, 887 F.2d at 1543, we decline to hold that the 
automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code overruled 
Bruning.  We conclude that the mere accrual of post-petition 
interest does not violate the automatic stay. 
 D. 
 We are not unaware that the result in this case may be 
viewed as harsh by student debtors saddled with the mounting 
costs of higher education.  In this case the Websters listed the 
claim of PHEAA as totalling a combined $34,302.74 on their 
bankruptcy schedules.  The Leepers listed the claim of PHEAA as 
totalling a combined $18,542.26 on their bankruptcy schedules.  
During the Websters' Chapter 13 plan, PHEAA will accrue almost 
$15,000 in interest on the Websters' debt.  During the Leepers' 
Chapter 13 plan, PHEAA will accrue almost $8,000 in interest on 
the Leepers' debt.  As a result, both the Leepers and the 
Websters will emerge from bankruptcy owing PHEAA more money than 
was owed to PHEAA at the time of their bankruptcy petitions. 
 However, whether Bruning should be applied to permit 
post-petition interest to accrue on nondischargeable student 
loans is a political decision.  Congress, which created the 
student loan program and which then decided for policy reasons to 
make debts arising from those loans nondischargeable (presumably 
with the knowledge that under Bruning post-petition interest 
would then also be nondischargeable) may choose to amend the 
statute with respect to the treatment of post-petition interest.  
But until and unless it does so, we see no basis for the courts 
to change the longstanding rule as to nondischargeability of 
post-petition interest. 
 Congress did provide for amelioration of the effect of 
nondischargeability in appropriate circumstances by authorizing 
the bankruptcy court to discharge the remainder of a debt for a 
student loan if, inter alia, the debt "will impose an undue 
hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents."  11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8)(B) (1988); see note 2 supra.  On this appeal, we have 
no occasion to determine whether the debtors status at the close 
of bankruptcy will be sufficient to support a finding of "undue 
hardship."  Undoubtedly, the amount of post-petition interest 
that will have accrued on the loans is a factor that the 
bankruptcy court will consider in making its "undue hardship" 
determination. 
 III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 
bankruptcy court did not err in ruling that PHEAA is entitled to 
accrue interest on the nondischargeable student loans during the 
pendency of the debtors' Chapter 13 bankruptcies.  We therefore 
will affirm the order of the district court. 
